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          1 Introduction
Despite clear-cut theoretical predictions (Bertola (1990) and Hopenhayn and
Rogerson (1993)), empirical studies on the impact of labour market regulations
have failed to ﬁnd substantive evidence of a negative causal relation between em-
ployment protection restrictions and the reallocation of labour (see, e.g., Nickell
and Layard, 1999). Diﬃculty in identifying the impact of these regulations on
employment may be one reason. For instance, studies using bivariate or multivari-
ate cross-country data (OECD 1999; Garibaldi, Konings and Pissarides (1996);
G´ omez-Salvador, Messina and Vallanti (2003)) may fail to correctly account for
unobservable country characteristics potentially correlated with both labour reg-
ulation and labour market outcomes, thus leading to biased estimates.
Studies exploiting within-country variation in the enforcement of EPL, either
over time or across ﬁrms, have the potential to overcome these problems.
Italy is one of the strictest countries in terms of employment protection leg-
islation and is therefore a particularly interesting case to study. Previous work
on Italy has exploited the within-country variation in the enforcement of EPL.1
Boeri and Jimeno (2003) assesses the eﬀect of EPL on lay-oﬀ probabilities. Bor-
garello, Garibaldi and Pacelli (2002), and Schivardi and Torrini (2004) evaluate
the eﬀects of EPL on the size distribution of Italian ﬁrms. These three papers
identify the eﬀect of EPL by exploiting the fact that, in Italy, ﬁrms below 15
employees are subject to much lower ﬁring costs than ﬁrms above 15 employees.2
This amounts to capture the eﬀect of interest by comparing the performance of
small and large ﬁrms. The underlying implicit identifying assumption is that
controlling for observable characteristics is enough to wipe out any behavioral
diﬀerences between small and large ﬁrms, and therefore the diﬀerent stringency
of EPL may be simply captured by the ﬁrm’s position relative to the 15 employees
threshold. However, unobservable characteristics may make small ﬁrms diﬀerent
from large ones and may make them behave diﬀerently. For instance, one may
argue that, even though in the presence of adjustment costs all ﬁrms optimally
do labour hoarding over the cycle, ﬁrms facing higher opportunity costs of capital
(say, small ﬁrms facing more severe liquidity constraints) are less willing to do
so. This, for instance, may already explain (at least part of) the ﬁnding of Boeri
and Jimeno (2003) that in Italy the probability of a lay-oﬀ is larger in small ﬁrms
than in large ﬁrms. Thus, unobservable characteristics may act as confounding
1Section 2 reviews the evolution of the Italian EPL.
2Borgarello, Garibaldi and Pacelli (2002) also presents results exploiting the temporal vari-
ation in EPL, as we do. However, diﬀerently from us, they only focus on the eﬀect of EPL on
ﬁrms’ size.
2factors and cast doubts on the correct identiﬁcation of the eﬀects of EPL.3
In this paper, we present new evidence on the impact of employment protec-
tion legislation on the Italian labour market that does not suﬀer from the above
shortcomings. We exploit the diﬀerential change in ﬁring costs for unfair dis-
missals in large and small ﬁrms after 1990. In that year, in fact, Italy introduced
a labour market reform which increased employment protection for workers em-
ployed under permanent contracts in ﬁrms with less than 15 employees relative
to those in ﬁrms with more than 15 employees. This reform allows identifying
the eﬀect of ﬁring costs by implementing a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences approach,
i.e. a comparison of the performance of ﬁrms of the same size, before and after
the reform, using large ﬁrms as the control group.
Our empirical analysis uses administrative data from the Italian Social Se-
curity Institute (INPS). Our data set is an employer-employee panel reporting,
among other information, the dates of appointment and separation of the worker,
the date of incorporation and termination of the ﬁrm and the yearly average
number of employees. Thus, we can examine how the 1990 Italian labour market
reform aﬀected (i) worker ﬂows (i.e. the probability of a match and the proba-
bility of a separation), (ii) ﬁrms entry and exit rates, and (iii) the shape of ﬁrms
employment policies over the cycle. Moreover, since we have sectoral information
as well, we can assess the extent to which the 1990 reform aﬀected the volatility
of employment policies over the cycle at the sectoral level.
Our results are easy to summarize. Controlling for sectoral ﬁxed eﬀects, re-
gion and time eﬀects, sector speciﬁc trends, a time-varying measure of sectoral
productivity, and size-speciﬁc cyclical eﬀects we ﬁnd that both accession and
separation probabilities went down after the reform for men and women in small
ﬁrms relative to large ﬁrms. The drop is a sizeable one, since the point estimates
imply a decrease of as much as 10%. We also ﬁnd that the eﬀect is more pro-
nounced in sectors that were more volatile before the reform.4 Moreover, despite
EPL being blamed as one of the major causes of unemployment among the young
because it makes more diﬃcult for them to get the ﬁrst job, we ﬁnd that young
workers of age below 25 did not experience any reductions in accession probabili-
ties in small ﬁrms relative to large ﬁrms. This is however consistent with the fact
that, in small ﬁrms, the size of the ﬁring costs depends on the wage rate, and is
3Other work exploiting within-country variation is Hunt (2000), Acemoglu and Angrist
(2001), Autor, Donohue III and Schwab (2002), Angrist and Kugler, (2003), Autor (2003),
Kugler, Jimeno, and Hernanz (2003).They tend to ﬁnd that restrictions on employment-at-will
have moderate eﬀects. Micco and Pag´ es (2004), diﬀerently, use a cross-country approach and
exploit diﬀerences across sectors to implement a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences methodology.
4This is reassuring since it conﬁrms that we are indeed capturing the eﬀect of the reform,
rather than the eﬀect of some other contemporaneous shock or legislation change that should
not have aﬀected diﬀerently sectors with diﬀerent volatilities.
3therefore arguably lower for young workers with shorter tenure.5
Exploiting the information available on the employers, we also estimate the
eﬀect of EPL on ﬁrms entry and exit rates. Using a similar set of controls as
above, we ﬁnd that the entry rate went down in small ﬁrms relative to large
ﬁrms, while the exit rate went up. Also in this case the eﬀects appear to be
stronger in sectors whose pre-reform employment volatility was larger. The fact
that the reform induced higher exit rates, the more so in more volatile sectors,
suggest that higher EPL, reducing the ability of the ﬁrms to adapt to the cycle,
may force them out of the market. However, since according to the Italian law
ﬁrms exiting the market do not have to pay ﬁring costs, it may also be possible
that some ﬁrms, possibly the smallest, may be induced to exit and re-enter under
a diﬀerent label in order to reduce their workforce and circumvent the legislation.
Moreover, we estimate the eﬀect of the reform on the employment growth rates
at the ﬁrm level, ﬁnding that they were negatively aﬀected. This implies that,
as expected, the reform made small ﬁrms’ employment policies ﬂatter relative to
large ﬁrms.
Finally, we aggregate our data and estimate the sectoral volatility of employ-
ment growth of small and large ﬁrms at the sectoral level. We ﬁnd that, also at
the sectoral level, the 1990 reform reduced the volatility of employment growth.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes how ﬁring
restrictions evolved in Italy. Section 3 explains the identiﬁcation strategy used
to evaluate the impact of EPL in Italy. Section 4 describes the Social Security
data and presents estimates of the impact of increased strictness of employment
protection in small ﬁrms in Italy after 1990 on employment turnover and ﬁrms’
entry and exit rates.
2 Employment Protection Regulations in Italy
Italy, together with the other Southern European countries, is considered one
of the strictest countries in terms of employment protection legislation (EPL).
For example, a study by Lazear (1990) for the period 1956-84 and a study by
Bertola (1990) for the late 1980’s rank Italy as the strictest country in terms of
EPL. A study by the OECD’s Employment Outlook for the late 1980’s, ranks
Portugal as the strictest country followed by Italy, Spain, and Greece. A similar
study by the OECD’s Employment Outlook for the late 1990’s, which includes
Turkey, North America, and Transition Economies as well, continues to rank
5This implies that, in Italy, the overall eﬀect of EPL on the accession probabilities of the
young may still be rather large, because in ﬁrms above 15 employees ﬁring costs are independent
of the wage.
4Portugal as the strictest, followed by Turkey, Greece, Italy and Spain. The study
by Nicoletti et al. (2000), which does not include some of the countries in the
OECD’s Employment Outlook study, also ranks Italy third, after Portugal and
the Netherlands, in terms of the strictness of regulations on permanent contracts.
Dismissals were ﬁrst regulated in Italy in 1966 through Law No. 604, which
established that, in case of unfair dismissal, employers had the choice to either
hire back workers or pay severance, which depended on tenure and ﬁrm size.
Severance pay for unfair dismissals ranged between 5 and 8 months for workers
with less than two and a half years of tenure, between 5 and 12 months for those
between two and a half and 20 years of tenure, and between 5 and 14 months for
workers with more than 20 years of tenure in ﬁrms with more than 60 employees.6
Firms with less than 60 employees had to pay half the severance paid by ﬁrms
with more than 60 employees, and ﬁrms with less than 35 workers were completely
exempted.
In 1970, the Statuto dei Lavoratori (Law No. 300) established that all ﬁrms
with more than 15 employees had to hire back workers and pay their foregone
wages in case of unfair dismissals. Firms with less than 15 employees remained
exempted.7 A number of recent studies show evidence of the binding eﬀect of
this law for ﬁrms at the 15 employee threshold. For example, the last annual
report by the Italian Statistical Oﬃce, ISTAT, shows a larger fraction transiting
to a smaller size category for ﬁrms around the 15 employee threshold than for
ﬁrms at any other sizes. Similarly, Garibaldi, Pacelli and Borgarello (2003) ﬁnd a
higher probability of inaction and a higher probability of reducing ﬁrm size than
of increasing it for ﬁrms at the 15 employee threshold.
Given the high costs of unfair dismissals for larger ﬁrms, in 1987 the Italian
government liberalized the use of temporary contracts in an attempt to provide
more ﬂexibility to employers. Prior to 1987, temporary contracts could be used for
speciﬁc projects, seasonal work, or for replacement of temporarily absent perma-
nent workers. After 1987, temporary contracts could be used more widely subject
to collective agreements specifying certain target groups. While the extended use
of temporary contracts allowed for more ﬂexibility in the labour market, these
contracts could only be renewed up to two times and could only have a maxi-
mum length of 15 months. Consequently, even though temporary contracts were
liberalized after this reform, the use of temporary contracts remained heavily
6By contrast, severance pay for fair dismissals is paid from workers’ retained earnings, so
they entail no cost to employers.
7Boeri and Jimeno (2003) present a theoretical explanation of why these exemptions may
be in place to begin with. They argue that exempting small ﬁrms reduces the disemployment
eﬀect of EPL, because small ﬁrms subject to EPL have to pay much higher eﬃciency wages to
discourage shirking than large ﬁrms.
5regulated in Italy compared to other countries.8
Moreover, soon after the 1987 reform, Law No. 108 was introduced in 1990
further restricting dismissals for permanent contracts. In particular, this law
introduced severance payments of between 2.5 and 6 months pay for unfair dis-
missals in ﬁrms with less than 15 employees. In contrast, ﬁrms with more than
15 employees still had to hire back workers and pay foregone wages in case of
unfair dismissals. This means that the cost of unfair dismissals for ﬁrms with
less than 15 employees increased relative to the cost for ﬁrms with more than 15
employees after 1990.9
In 1997, Italy moved again in the direction of trying to provide ﬁrms with a
margin of ﬂexibility by legalizing the use of temporary help agencies. However, as
the 1987 reform, the legalization of temporary help agencies was limited in that it
imposed restrictions on the maximum number of possible renewals of temporary
help workers.10
While the 1990 reform increased the costs of unfair dismissals for permanent
contracts in ﬁrms with less than 15 employees relative to ﬁrms with more than
15 employees, the 1987 and 1997 reforms introduced ﬂexibility at the margin by
deregulating the use of temporary contracts and temporary layoﬀs. Since our
data is for the period of 1986 to 1995, in this paper we exploit the temporal
change in dismissal costs generated by the 1990 reform for permanent workers,
which applied diﬀerently for small and large ﬁrms.11
8Note that, according to the OECD’s Employment Outlook (1999), Italy ranked ﬁrst in
terms of strictness of the regulation of ﬁxed-term contracts during the 1980’s and it continued
to rank ﬁrst during the 1990’s.
9In 1991, the Italian government introduced also other reforms. In one, it aimed at providing
ﬁscal incentives by reducing payroll taxes (i.e., social security contributions) for ﬁrms with
more than 15 employees. As shown in Kugler, Jimeno, and Hernanz (2003) while an increase
in dismissal costs should reduce both hiring and dismissals, a reduction in payroll taxes should
increase hiring but have no eﬀect on dismissals. Consequently, this reform should have increased
hiring but should not have aﬀected dismissals. Another reform implemented in 1991 deals with
collective dismissals taking place in ﬁrms with more than 15 employees. It introduces a special
procedure in case at least 5 workers are dismissed (in a range of 110 days). In order to deal
with this (potentially) confounding factor, we limit our sample to ﬁrms below 35 employees less
subject to be hit by shocks forcing them to ﬁre as much as 5 employees (or more). Finally, in
1992, the government also eliminated a wage indexation mechanism (Scala Mobile) which had
been adopted in 1945 and which applied to ﬁrms of all sizes.
10OECD measures of the strictness of regulations on temporary help agencies ranked Italy
ﬁrst in the late 1980’s, but ranked Italy 6th in the late 1990’s after Turkey, Greece, Spain,
Portugal and Belgium (Employment Outlook, 1999).
11In our empirical analysis we also tried limiting the sample to the period from 1987 to 1995
to eliminate any possible eﬀect of the liberalization of temporary contracts in 1987. In any
case, though, we concentrate on permanent workers in our analysis.
63 Identiﬁcation Strategy
The goal of this paper is to identify the impact of dismissal costs on permanent
employment. In order to do so, we compare the change in the performance of
ﬁrms with less than 15 employees before and after the 1990 reform to the change
in the performance of ﬁrms with more than 15 employees. However, one may
argue that ﬁrm size may be aﬀected by the reform itself. In order to deal with
this possibility, we deﬁne as small only ﬁrms that have less than 15 employees
in all years before the reform and as large only ﬁrms that have more than 15
employees in all years before the reform. In other words, we eliminate from the
sample the ﬁrms whose size crosses the 15 employees threshold before the reform.
We do so in order to focus on the ﬁrms whose size is already at some ”steady
state” level. The reason is that the theory suggests that in steady state EPL
should not aﬀect the average employment levels but only deviations from the
average.
The strategy to identify the impact of the change in dismissal costs is illus-
trated in Figures 1-4 and in tables 1-4. Figures 1 and 2 show accession and
separation probabilities in ﬁrms with less than 15 employees and ﬁrms with more
than 15 employees for the period 1986 to 1995. Figure 1 shows a sharper decline
in accession probabilities in small ﬁrms than in large ﬁrms, starting from 1991, i.e.
right after the 1990 reform. Figure 2, though less eyeballing, still shows a some-
what more pronounced decline in the separation probabilities in small relative
to big ﬁrms starting in 1989. The ﬁgures in Table 1 conﬁrm this interpretation.
Figure 3 (and the corresponding ﬁgures in table 3) shows a more marked decrease
of small ﬁrms entry after 1990 relative to large ﬁrms, while ﬁgure 4 shows that
exit rates of both small and large ﬁrms went steadily up from 1989 to 1993.
Accessions and separations. To control for the possibility that reduced
accessions and separations are the result of other shocks occurring during the
post-reform period, we estimate a linear probability model using the panel of
workers described in section 4. The baseline speciﬁcation that controls for year



















The dependent variable mijt is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a
match was created or destroyed, i.e., if there was either an accession or a sepa-
ration, between worker i and ﬁrm j at time t; the matrix Xijt includes the ﬁxed
sectoral eﬀects, the time eﬀect, worker characteristics such as age, occupation
and gender, and ﬁrm characteristics such as the geographical location and the
7yearly average number of employees; Postt is a dummy that takes the value of
1 after 1990 and zero otherwise; DS
j is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the
worker is employed in a small ﬁrm and 0 if the worker is employed in a big ﬁrm.
The interaction term between the small ﬁrm dummy and the post-reform dummy
is included to capture the eﬀects of interest.12
Since the theory predicts that the introduction of EPL should have a stronger
eﬀect on more volatile sectors, we can check if we are indeed capturing the eﬀect
of the reform, by analyzing the employment volatility of the diﬀerent sectors. If
the more volatile sectors are the most aﬀected then we may be conﬁdent that
our identiﬁcation strategy is indeed picking the eﬀect of the increase in EPL.
In order to do so, we assume that the ”true” sectoral volatility of employment










































where Vk denotes the variance of employment growth in the pre-reform period of
ﬁrms above and below 15 employees. The coeﬃcient γ2 is meant to capture the
diﬀerential eﬀect of EPL on sectors with diﬀerent volatility.
While the inclusion of time eﬀects allows controlling for the possibility that
the change in turnover after the post-reform period was due to macro shocks, it
is possible that the cycle aﬀects small and large ﬁrms diﬀerently. If this were
the case, then we should have observed both reduced accessions and increased
separations during the post-reform period due to the strong recession of 1992 and
1993. Instead, Figures 1 and 2 above show reduced accessions and separations.


























where Et is an expansion variable which is either a dummy taking the value of
1 during the recession years of 1992 and 1993 or the growth rate of GDP. The
size-speciﬁc cyclical eﬀect is captured away by the interaction term between the
small ﬁrm dummy DS
j and the expansion variable Et.
12Other speciﬁcations, where we control for time-varying sectoral productivity, sector speciﬁc
time eﬀects and workers ﬁxed-eﬀects, are discussed in section 4 along with the results.
8Firms’ entry and exit. In a similar way we estimate the eﬀect of the
EPL reform on ﬁrms’ entry and exit rates. In order to do so, we exploit the
employer-employee nature of our panel and focus on the longitudinal information
on ﬁrm characteristics. We estimate a linear probability model whose baseline
speciﬁcation reads as follows:
E
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The dependent variable µjt is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if ﬁrm
j entered or exited the market at time t; the matrix ξjt includes the ﬁxed sectoral
eﬀects, a time eﬀect, the geographical location of the ﬁrm and its yearly average
number of employees; the variables Postt and DS
j are, as described above, the
post-reform dummy and the small ﬁrm dummy. Also in this case, we extend
the above speciﬁcation along several dimensions. We check whether EPL aﬀects
entry and exit diﬀerentially depending on the sectors’ volatility (along the lines
of equation (2)) and also control for size-speciﬁc cyclical eﬀects (along the lines
of equation (3)), and for time-varying sectoral productivity, sector speciﬁc time
eﬀects and ﬁrms ﬁxed-eﬀects.
4 Estimates of the Eﬀects of EPL
4.1 Data Description
The data set is drawn from the Italian Social Security Administration (INPS)
archives for the years 1986-1995. The original data set collects social security
forms of a 1/90 random sample employees every year, with employees born on
the 10th of March, June, September, and December of every year being sampled.
The original archives only include information on private sector ﬁrms in the
manufacturing and service sectors, so that it excludes all workers in the public
sector and agriculture. We use a 10% random sample from this original data set.
The data set includes individual longitudinal records generated using social
security numbers. However, since the INPS collects information on private sector
employees for the purpose of computing retirement beneﬁts, employees are only
followed through their employment spells. The data, thus, stops following indi-
viduals who move into self-employment, the public sector, the agricultural sector,
the underground economy, unemployment, and retirement. The data set also in-
cludes longitudinal records for ﬁrms employing the randomly selected workers in
the sample using the ﬁrms’ name, address, and social security and ﬁscal codes.
While the data set includes a random sample of workers, the probability that a
9ﬁrm is selected increases with size. When using the panel of ﬁrms, we account
for this by weighting each observation by the probability that it appears in the
sample given by average number of employees divided by 90.
The data set is, thus, an employer-employee panel with information on workers
and ﬁrm characteristics. In particular, the data includes information on employ-
ees’ age, gender, occupation, dates of accession and separation with each ﬁrm,
and type of contract, and information on ﬁrms’ location, sector of employment,
number of employees, and ﬁrms’ dates of incorporation and termination. The
advantage of this administrative data for the purpose of studying the eﬀects of
EPL on worker transitions and ﬁrms entry and exit probabilities is that, con-
trary to survey data which measures transitions by matching quarterly data and
using tenure information to identify job changes, it identiﬁes exact dates of ac-
cessions and separations according to when social security contributions began
and ended. Moreover, the exact dates of incorporation and termination of the
ﬁrm, as an employer, in the INPS archives are also recorded.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on permanent workers by ﬁrm size,
before and after the 1990 reform. The table shows lower accession rates for all
age groups (young, middle-aged and old) after the reform both in small and large
ﬁrms. However, the drop in accession rates after the reform seems to be larger in
small than in large ﬁrms. Similarly, separation rates are lower for all age groups
after the reform both in small and large ﬁrms, but the drop in separation rates
was much more pronounced in small ﬁrms. These simple comparisons of means
suggest that the increase in dismissal costs in small relative to big ﬁrms did have
an impact on accessions and separations. Furthermore, the raw data seem to
indicate that the most aﬀected age group, both in terms of lower accessions and
separation, is the middle-aged group.
Tables 2 and 3 present descriptive statistics for men and women separately
by ﬁrm size, before and after the 1990 reform. As to men, the pattern is very
similar to the general one just described: both accessions and separations go
down after 1990 and more so in small ﬁrms. The middle-aged males are the
ones that suﬀer the largest drop in accession, while old males suﬀer the smallest
drop in separations. As to women, the raw data present a more varied picture.
Accessions seem to fall more in small than in large ﬁrms only for middle-aged
female workers, while separations decrease more in small ﬁrms than in large ﬁrms
for both young and middle-aged female workers. This may suggest that the Italian
1990 EPL reform might have had no (or, at best, only little) eﬀect on old female
workers, while apparently having some bearing on all males age groups.
Finally, table 4 presents descriptive statistics on ﬁrms’ characteristics. In
particular, it shows that entry rates go down after the reform, but the drop is
10more pronounced for small ﬁrms, and that exit rates, diﬀerently, go up after the
reform, though less so for small ﬁrms. As a last ﬁgure we present, at the cost of a
dramatic decrease in the number of observations, the variance of the changes in
employment (in percentage terms) for small and large ﬁrms, by year and sector.
The raw ﬁgures show that the volatility of employment has gone down after the
reform for small ﬁrms while it has increased for large ﬁrms.
The next section presents regression results which control for covariates.
4.2 Eﬀect on Accessions
Table 5, 6 and 7 report marginal eﬀects of a linear probability model for accessions
estimated using equations (1), (2) and (3). The dependent variable is a variable
that takes the value of 1 if the person joined a ﬁrm in a given year and zero
otherwise. In all speciﬁcations only permanent workers are included. Moreover,
since we will use ﬁrms with more than 15 employees as a control group, in order
to ease comparison across ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes only ﬁrms with no more than
35 workers are included.13
In Table 1 the baseline speciﬁcation (column 1) controls for worker’s age
and occupation, ﬁrm size, and for sectoral, regional and year eﬀects. The eﬀect
of interest is captured by the interaction between the post-reform dummy and
a dummy for ﬁrms under 15 employees. The reported standard errors allow for
clustering by period-size group to control for common random eﬀects within these
cells.
Panels A and B of Table 5 show the results for men and women, respectively.
The results show a large and statistically signiﬁcant decline in permanent ac-
cessions in small relative to large ﬁrms after the 1990 reform was introduced.
Column (1) shows that accession probabilities decreased by 0.019 or 8.2% for
men and by 0.02 or 9.2% for women in small relative to big ﬁrms during the
reform years. Including sector-speciﬁc trends and sector productivity in columns
(2) and (3) leaves the eﬀects on accession probabilities basically unchanged to
−0.018 for men and to between −0.02 for women.
Columns (4) and (5) of Table 5 report the results controlling for size-speciﬁc
cyclical eﬀects as in equation (3). The results for men in Panel A show a smaller
(but still signiﬁcant) eﬀect of −0.012 and −0.01 using, respectively, the expan-
sion dummy and the GDP growth to control for size-speciﬁc cyclical eﬀects. By
contrast, the results for women now show bigger eﬀects of −0.027 and −0.026
when the size-speciﬁc cyclical eﬀect is controlled with the expansion dummy and
GDP growth, respectively.14
13Results are robust to changes in the 35 workers threshold.
14Since we are using panel data, it is of ocursee possible to include worker eﬀects to account,
11Columns (6) includes the third-level interaction between the post-reform dummy,
the small ﬁrm dummy and the volatility of employment growth, as described in
equation (2).15 This conﬁrms that our identiﬁcation strategy is indeed capturing
the eﬀect of EPL.
Tables 6 and 7 report, separately for men and women, the eﬀect of the 1990
reform on accessions by age groups. As to men, the more pronounced decrease
in accessions took place for the middle-aged workers. Young and old men seem
not to have been aﬀected much. Diﬀerently, in the case of women the size of
the decrease in the accession rate seems to go up monotonically with age. So,
even though at ﬁrst glance the eﬀect of EPL does not seem to be vary much
across genders, the analysis by age classes shows that the greatest reduction in
the probability of a match is suﬀered by old women (around −0.074 or as much
as 67.2%), while middle-aged men and women suﬀer a drop of around −0.021
or 9%. The eﬀect on the young of either sexes is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero. The larger reduction in hiring of the elderly may be due to the fact that
the dismissal costs, depending on the wage rate, increase with age.
4.3 Eﬀect on Separations
Table 8, 9 and 10 report marginal eﬀects of a linear probability model for sepa-
rations. The dependent variable is now a variable that takes the value of 1 if the
person separated from the ﬁrm in a given year and zero otherwise. The controls
in these speciﬁcations are as in the linear probability models for accessions.
As before, in Table 8 Panel A reports the results for men and Panel B for
women. The results show that separation probabilities decreased for both men
and women. For example, the results from the basic speciﬁcation show a de-
crease in separation probabilities of 0.029 or 9% for men and of 0.034 or 10.4% for
women. Controlling for sector-speciﬁc trends and sector productivity (columns
(2) and (3)) the point estimates increase slightly for men (−0.031) while remain-
ing basically unchanged for women (between −0.035 and −0.033).
The results controlling for size-speciﬁc cyclical eﬀects in Columns (4) and (5)
of Table 8 show roughly similar eﬀects (of between −0.026 and −0.031) for men
for instance, for the possibility that less-employable individuals may look for employment in
smaller ﬁrms. The results, not reported, show similar but less precisely estimated results that
does not reach signiﬁcance at the conventional levels. The reason why ﬁxed-eﬀects estimates
are less precise is due to the fact that workers entering the sample are not followed outside the
employment status. This implies that on average the number of observation per individual is
small (between 3 and 4) and therefore standard errors are large.
15Also in this case we have ran additional speciﬁcations (controlling for size-speciﬁc cyclical
eﬀects, sectoral productivity and individuals eﬀects) that are in line with the results of column
(6).
12and larger eﬀects (of between −0.0461 and −0.047) for women. When turning to
the speciﬁcations including the third-level interaction between the post-reform
dummy, the small ﬁrm dummy and the pre-reform volatility of employment
growth in column (6), there does not seem to be a diﬀerential eﬀect of EPL
in more volatile sectors, as far as men are concerned. The opposite is true for
women.
Tables 9 and 10 report, separately for men and women, the eﬀect of the 1990
reform on separations by age groups. As to men, accessions go down for all groups,
the older suﬀering the stronger eﬀect. Moreover, for the latter group there is also
evidence that the eﬀect is stronger the higher the sector volatility. Turning to
women, the old seem to be the least aﬀected by the reform, while the probability
of a separation goes down for both the young and, more pronouncedly, for middle-
aged women. Evidence of a stronger eﬀect of the reform on more volatile sectors
appears in column (6) for all age groups.
4.4 Eﬀect on Firms Entry and Exit
Table 11 reports marginal eﬀects of a linear probability model for estimated using
equation (4). The dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value
of 1 if the ﬁrm entered (Panel A) or exited (Panel B) the market. While the
data set includes a random sample of workers, the probability that a ﬁrm is
selected increases with size. We account for this by weighting each observation
by the probability that the ﬁrm actually appears in the sample, which is given
by average number of employees divided by 90.16
In Table 11 the baseline speciﬁcation (column 1) controls for ﬁxed sectoral
and region eﬀects and for the total number of employees in the ﬁrm.
Panel A shows, consistently across all speciﬁcations, that the entry rate of
small ﬁrms goes down relative to large ﬁrms after the 1990 reform. The range
of the reduction lies between −0.005 (or 10% reduction) and −0.009 (or 18%
reduction). Moreover, columns (7) and (8) show that the reduction in the entry
rates is larger the larger the employment volatility.
Panel B shows, again consistently across all speciﬁcations, that the exit rate
of small ﬁrms goes up relative to large ﬁrms after the 1990 reform. This is not
surprising, since an increase in ﬁring costs lowers the present value of the future
stream of proﬁts, thus leading to more exit. Again columns (7) and (8) show
that the increase in the exit rates is larger the larger the employment volatility,
16As for accessions and separations, only ﬁrms with no more than 35 workers are included
and the eﬀect of interest is captured by the interaction between the post-reform dummy and a
dummy for ﬁrms under 15 employees. Also in this case, the reported standard errors allow for
clustering by period-size group to control for common random eﬀects within these cells.
13i.e. in sectors where the expected ﬁring costs are higher.
4.5 Eﬀect on Employment Policies at the Firm and Sector
Level
Next, we analyze whether the increase in EPL ﬂattens the labour demand of small
ﬁrms relative to large ﬁrms. In order to do so, we regress the absolute value of
ﬁrms’ employment growth on the interaction between the post reform dummy
and the small ﬁrm dummy, controlling for a number of covariates. Results are
presented in Table 12. All speciﬁcations control for ﬁxed sectoral and region
eﬀects and for the total number of employees in the ﬁrm. Column (2) includes
sector speciﬁc trends and column (3) sectoral productivity. Columns (4) to (6)
control for ﬁrms eﬀect and for size-speciﬁc cyclical eﬀects.
Panel A reports results assuming that errors are i.i.d., while in Panel B and
C errors are assumed to follow an auto-regressive process of order one and two,
respectively. All speciﬁcations show that the 1990 reform ﬂattened the labour de-
mand of small ﬁrms relative to large ﬁrms. The size of the reduction seems large,
as the lowest point estimates (in columns (4)-(6) in panel A where we control
for ﬁrms ﬁxed-eﬀect and for size-speciﬁc cyclical eﬀects) are all approximately of
−0.03, which implies a drop in the of as much as 15% in the willingness to adjust
employment over the cycle.
Finally, we ask whether the reform actually reduced the sectoral variance of
employment. Therefore, we compute the variance of employment changes for
small and large ﬁrms, by year and sector. Of course the number of observation
drops dramatically - to 200 - since we are left with only 20 observation per year:
the variance of small and large ﬁrms employment changes in ten sectors. Anyway,
we use it as a dependent variable and regress it on controls17 plus the usual
interaction between the post reform dummy and the small ﬁrm dummy. Results
are reported in Table 13 and show that the variance of employment changes does
become lower after 1990 in small ﬁrms relative to large ones.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we present new evidence on the impact of dismissal costs on
turnover and employment. We use an employer-employee panel from the Ital-
ian Social Security to empirically assess the causal eﬀect of labour market reg-
ulations on economic outcomes. We do so by exploiting the fact that dismissal
17The speciﬁcations used are the same as in the previous tables, with the exclusion, of course,
of the ﬁrm level controls.
14costs increased after 1990 in Italy for ﬁrms with less than 15 employees relative
to larger ﬁrms. This reform allows to adopt a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences approach
that arguably helps overcoming the identiﬁcation problems usually plaguing both
the studies using cross-country variation in EPL and the ones exploiting within-
country variation in the enforcement of EPL.
We have results on the eﬀect of the reform on workers accession and separation
rates; ﬁrms entry and exit rates; the shape of ﬁrms employment policies over the
cycle.
Controlling for a host of variables we ﬁnd that both accession and separation
probabilities went down after the reform for men and women in small ﬁrms rel-
ative to large ﬁrms, with the point estimates implying a decrease of as much as
10%. We also ﬁnd that the eﬀect is more pronounced in sectors that were more
volatile before the reform. Moreover, we ﬁnd that young workers of age below 25
did not experience any reductions in accession probabilities in small ﬁrms relative
to large ﬁrms. This is consistent with the fact that, in small ﬁrms, the size of the
ﬁring costs depends on the wage rate, and is therefore arguably lower for young
workers with shorter tenure.
As far as the eﬀect of EPL on ﬁrms entry and exit rates, we ﬁnd that the
former went down in small ﬁrms relative to large ﬁrms, while the latter rate went
up. Also in this case the eﬀects appear to be stronger in sectors whose pre-reform
employment volatility was larger.
Finally, [?] the estimates of the eﬀect of the 1990 reform on ﬁrms employment
growth rates show, not surprisingly, a negative eﬀect, implying that the reform
made small ﬁrms’ employment policies ﬂatter relative to large ﬁrms.
15References
[1] Acemoglu, Daron and Joshua Angrist, (2001), Consequences of Employment
Protection? The Case of the American with Disabilities Act, Journal of
Political Economy, 109(5): 915-957.
[2] Angrist, Joshua and Adriana Kugler, (2003), Protective or Counter-
Productive? labour Market Institutions and the Eﬀect of Immigration on
EU Natives, Economic Journal
[3] Autor, David, (2003), Outsourcing at Will: The Contribution of Unjust
Dismissal Doctrine to the Growth of Employment Outsourcing, Journal of
labour Economics, 21(1): 1-42.
[4] Autor, David, John J. Donohue III and Stewart J. Schwab, (2002), The
Costs of Wrongful Discharge Laws, NBER Working Paper No. 9425.
[5] Bertola, Giuseppe, (1990), Job Security, Employment, and Wages, European
Economic Review, 54(4): 851-79.
[6] Bertola, Giuseppe and Richard Rogerson, (1997), Institutions and labour
Reallocation, European Economic Review, Vol. 41, n6, June, 1147-71.
[7] Boeri, Tito and Juan F. Jimeno, (2003), The Eﬀects of Employment Protec-
tion: Learning from Variable Enforcement, CEPR Discussion Paper No.3926.
[8] Borgarello, Andrea, Pietro Garibaldi and Lia Pacelli, (2004), Employment
Protection Legislation and the Size of Firms, Il Giornale degli Economisti,
n. 1, 2004
[9] Contini, Bruno, (2002), Osservatorio sulla mobilit` a del lavoro in Italia,
Bologna, Il Mulino
[10] Garibaldi, Pietro., Josef Konings and Christopher Pissarides, (1997), Gross
Job Reallocation and Labour Market Policy, in Snower D and and Guillermo
de la Dehesa (ed.), Unemployment Policy, Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge.
[11] G´ omez-Salvador, Ram´ on, Julian Messina and Giovanna Vallanti, (2004),
Gross Job Flows in Europe, ECB Working Paper, N.318, March
[12] Hopenhayn, Hugo and Richard Rogerson, (1993), Job Turnover and Policy
Evaluations: A General Equilibrium Analysis, Journal of Political Economy,
Vol. 101., October, 915-38.
16[13] Hunt, Jennifer, (2000), Firing Costs, Employment Fluctuations, and Average
Employment: An Examination of Germany, Economica, 67(266):177-202.
[14] ISTAT, (2002), Annual Report. Rome: ISTAT Publications.
[15] Kugler, Adriana, Juan F. Jimeno and Virginia Hernanz, (2003), Employment
Consequences of Restrictive Permanent Contracts: Evidence from Spanish
labour Market Reforms, CEPR Working Paper No. 3724.
[16] Kugler, Adriana, (1999), The Impact of Firing Costs on Turnover and Un-
employment: Evidence form the Colombian Labour Market Reform, Inter-
national Tax and Public Finance, 6(3): 389-410.
[17] Lazear, Edward (1990), Job Security Provisions and Employment, Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 105(3): 699-726.
[18] Micco, Alejandro, and Carmen Pag´ es (2004) Employment Protection And
Gross Flows: A Diﬀerence-In-Diﬀerence Approach, Inter-American Devel-
opment Bank, mimeo
[19] Nickell, Stephen and Richard Layard, (1999), labour Market Institutions and
Economic Performance, in David Card and Orley Ashenfelter, eds. Handbook
of labour Economics, Vol.3C, pp. 3029-2084.
[20] OECD, (1999), Employment Outlook, Paris: OECD
[21] Oyer, Paul and Scott Schaeﬀer, (2000), Layoﬀs and Litigation, RAND Jour-
nal of Economics, 31(2): 345-358.
[22] Schivardi, Fabiano, and Roberto Torrini, (2004), Firm Size Distribution
And Employment Protection Legislation In Italy, Tema di discussione della
Banca d’Italia, n. 504, giugno 2004
17Figure 1: Yearly accession probabilities conditional on ﬁrm size (below/above 15
employees)
Figure 2: Yearly separation probabilities conditional on ﬁrm size (below/above
15 employees)
18Figure 3: Yearly entry probabilities conditional on ﬁrm size (below/above 15
employees)
Figure 4: Yearly exit probabilities conditional on ﬁrm size (below/above 15 em-
ployees)
19Table 1: Descriptive statistics by firm size, before and after the reform
Variables Pre-reform Post-reform Pre-reform Post-reform
22.52 23 22.47 22.95
(2.01) (1.76) (2.09) (1.91)
0.56 0.57 0.55 0.56
(0.5) (0.49) (0.5) (0.5)
0.75 0.78 0.8 0.84
(0.44) (0.41) (0.4) (0.37)
6.05 6.34 24.51 23.64
(3.91) (4.05) (5.78) (5.85)
0.27 0.23 0.23 0.21
(0.44) (0.42) (0.42) (0.41)
0.36 0.29 0.29 0.24
(0.48) (0.45) (0.45) (0.43)
N 4846 3001 1503 1079
35.48 35.57 36.24 36.23
(7.09) (7.01) (7.1) (7)
0.63 0.64 0.67 0.67
(0.48) (0.48) (0.47) (0.47)
0.61 0.63 0.63 0.65
(0.49) (0.48) (0.48) (0.48)
6.64 6.9 24.82 24.11
(4) (4.17) (5.73) (5.87)
0.23 0.18 0.17 0.15
(0.42) (0.38) (0.38) (0.36)
0.31 0.24 0.24 0.20
(0.46) (0.43) (0.43) (0.4)
N 12533 14127 4931 6629
55.38 55.37 55.33 55.42
(3.26) (3.4) (3.53) (3.4)
0.8 0.79 0.85 0.85
(0.4) (0.4) (0.36) (0.36)
0.8 0.78 0.81 0.73
(0.4) (0.41) (0.39) (0.44)
6.07 6.72 24.64 24.51
(4) (4.24) (5.71) (5.8)
0.14 0.12 0.09 0.1
(0.35) (0.33) (0.29) (0.29)
0.31 0.26 0.25 0.26
(0.46) (0.44) (0.44) (0.44)
N 2169 2301 879 1113
Small firms Large firms
A.  YOUNG (age ≤ 25)
Age
% of males
% of blue collars
Yearly average size of the firm
Accession rate
Separation rate
B.  MIDDLE AGE (26 ≤ age ≤ 50)
Age
% of males
% of blue collars
Yearly average size of the firm
Accession rate
Separation rate
C.  OLD (age > 50)
Age
% of males
% of blue collars
Yearly average size of the firm
Accession rate
Separation rate
Notes: Only permanent workers and firms below 35 workers are included. The pre-reform period goes from 1986 to
1990, the post-reform period from 1991 to 1995. Standard deviations in parenthesis.
20Table 2: MEN. Descriptive statistics by firm size, before and after the reform
Variables Pre-reform Post-reform Pre-reform Post-reform
22.56 22.94 22.47 22.96
(2.03) (1.81) (2.16) (1.87)
0.90 0.93 0.87 0.9
(0.30) (0.26) (0.34) (0.3)
6.04 6.38 24.63 23.76
(3.82) (3.97) (5.66) (5.88)
0.29 0.27 0.25 0.25
(0.46) (0.44) (0.43) (0.43)
0.39 0.31 0.31 0.26
(0.49) (0.46) (0.46) (0.44)
N 2722 1714 824 609
36.06 35.93 37.01 36.86
(7.16) (7.1) (7.27) (7.05)
0.76 0.78 0.72 0.72
(0.43) (0.41) (0.45) (0.45)
6.72 7.01 24.79 24.29
(4.04) (4.17) (5.74) (5.91)
0.23 0.18 0.17 0.15
(0.42) (0.39) (0.38) (0.36)
0.3 0.24 0.23 0.19
(0.46) (0.43) (0.42) (0.39)
N 7887 9090 3285 4432
55.51 55.56 55.35 55.57
(3.18) (3.4) (3.46) (3.4)
0.85 0.83 0.84 0.75
(0.36) (0.38) (0.37) (0.43)
6.26 6.87 24.62 24.41
(3.95) (4.24) (5.77) (5.77)
0.15 0.13 0.1 0.1
(0.36) (0.34) (0.3) (0.3)
0.31 0.27 0.24 0.27
(0.46) (0.44) (0.43) (0.44)
N 1733 1829 747 942
Small firms Large firms
A.  YOUNG (age ≤ 25)
Age
% of blue collars
Yearly average size of the firm
Accession rate
Separation rate
B.  MIDDLE AGE (26 ≤ age ≤ 50)
Age
% of blue collars
Yearly average size of the firm
Accession rate
Separation rate
C.  OLD (age > 50)
Age
% of blue collars
Yearly average size of the firm
Accession rate
Separation rate
Notes: Only permanent workers and firms below 35 workers are included. The pre-reform period goes from 1986 to
1990, the post-reform period from 1991 to 1995. Standard deviations in parenthesis.
21Table 3: WOMEN. Descriptive statistics by firm size, before and after the reform
Variables Pre-reform Post-reform Pre-reform Post-reform
22.47 23.09 22.48 22.93
(2.00) (1.69) (2.00) (1.96)
0.55 0.59 0.73 0.76
(0.5) (0.49) (0.44) (0.43)
6.07 6.29 24.36 23.5
(4.02) (4.16) (5.92) (5.82)
0.23 0.19 0.21 0.17
(0.42) (0.4) (0.41) (0.37)
0.32 0.27 0.26 0.23
(0.46) (0.45) (0.44) (0.42)
N 2124 1287 769 470
34.5 34.92 34.72 34.95
(6.85) (6.8) (6.49) (6.71)
0.34 0.37 0.45 0.51
(0.47) (0.48) (0.5) (0.5)
6.51 6.71 24.89 23.73
(3.92) (4.16) (5.7) (5.78)
0.22 0.17 0.17 0.14
(0.42) (0.38) (0.38) (0.35)
0.33 0.23 0.26 0.21
(0.47) (0.42) (0.44) (0.41)
N 4646 5037 1646 2197
54.88 54.66 55.25 54.6
(3.52) (3.32) (3.92) (3.32)
0.61 0.6 0.66 0.61
(0.49) (0.49) (0.48) (0.49)
5.31 6.11 24.72 25.06
(4.1) (4.17) (5.38) (5.95)
0.11 0.08 0.07 0.09
(0.32) (0.27) (0.25) (0.28)
0.31 0.24 0.32 0.23
(0.46) (0.43) (0.47) (0.42)
N 436 472 132 171
Small firms Large firms
A.  YOUNG (age ≤ 25)
Age
% of blue collars
Yearly average size of the firm
Accession rate
Separation rate
B.  MIDDLE AGE (26 ≤ age ≤ 50)
Age
% of blue collars
Age
% of blue collars
Yearly average size of the firm
Accession rate
22
Yearly average size of the firm
Accession rate
Separation rate
Notes: Only permanent workers and firms below 35 workers are included. The pre-reform period goes from 1986 to
1990, the post-reform period from 1991 to 1995. Standard deviations in parenthesis.
Separation rate
C.  OLD (age > 50)Table 4: FIRMS. Descriptive statistics by firm size, before and after the reform
Variables Pre-reform Post-reform Pre-reform Post-reform
0.050 0.045 0.028 0.027
(0.218) (0.206) (0.166) (0.163)
0.048 0.052 0.025 0.029
(0.213) (0.221) (0.157) (0.168)
6.073 6.475 25.027 24.129
(3.923) (4.141) (5.662) (5.861)
N 22207 22226 6921 8695
0.137 0.127 0.025 0.095
(0.096) (0.087) (.0153) (0.123)
N 50 50 49 49
23
Small firms Large firms
Notes: Only firms below 35 workers are included. The pre-reform period goes from 1986 to 1990, the post-reform
period from 1991 to 1995. Standard deviations in parenthesis.
Entry rate
Exit rate
Yearly average size of the firm
Variance of employment growthTable 5: Effects of the 1990 reform on accessions by gender
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.014 0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.007 0.002
(0.017) (0.012) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.023)
-0.023 -0.025 -0.025 -0.025 -0.039 -0.068
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015)* (0.02)**
-0.019 -0.018 -0.018 -0.012 -0.01 0.047
(0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)** (0.004)* (0.006)***
- - - - - -0.336
- - - - - (0.01)***
0.033 -0.011 -0.011 -0.008 -0.016 0.027
(0.02) (0.007) (0.01) (0.011) (0.014) (0.021)
0.043 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.053 0.07
(0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.037) (0.028)*
-0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.027 -0.026 0.07
(0.002)*** (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.004)*** (0.007)** (0.002)***
- - - - - -0.515
- - - - - (0.016)***
Sector and Region fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Trend YES NO NO NO NO YES
Sector specific trends NO YES YES YES YES NO
Productivity NO NO YES YES YES NO
Recession dummy NO NO NO YES NO NO
GDP growth rate NO NO NO NO YES NO
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Post 1990×Small firms×Pre-reform
variance of empl. growth by sector
Post 1990 
Small firms
Post 1990 × Small firms 
Post 1990 
Small firms
Post 1990 × Small firms 
Post 1990×Small firms×Pre-reform
variance of empl. growth by sector
Notes: Only permanent workers and firms below 35 workers are included. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis allow for clustering by period/size. All specifications control for sectoral and region effects, age,
occupation and total number of employees in the firm. Some specifications include sectoral productivity which
is calculated as value-added deflated using a sector-level PPI over the number of workers using 1995 as the
base year. Columns (4), and (5) control for size-specific cyclical effects. Column (4) interacts the small dummy
with an expansion dummy, which takes the value of 1 for 1992-1993 and 0 otherwise, while column (5)
interacts the small dummy with GDP growth. Column (6) includes interactions between the small firm dummy,
the post reform dummy and the pre-reform variance of employment growth by sector and size. *** denotes
significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and * denotes significance at the 10%
level.
A.  MEN - N = 35762
B.  WOMEN - N = 19276Table 6: MEN. Effects of the 1990 reform on accessions by age groups
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.007 -0.01 -0.008 -0.021 -0.028 -0.001
(0.061) (0.053) (0.058) (0.06) (0.067) (0.064)
-0.009 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.021 -0.061
(0.019) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.032) (0.037)
-0.018 -0.013 -0.013 0.003 -0.008 0.13
(0.005)** (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.023) (0.005)***
- - - - - -0.867
- - - - - (0.039)***
0.011 0.005 0.006 0.003 -0.004 -0.004
(0.014) (0.009) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.022)
-0.033 -0.034 -0.034 -0.034 -0.055 -0.066
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018)**
-0.022 -0.021 -0.021 -0.016 -0.01 0.017
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)** (0.007)*
- - - - - -0.152
- - - - - (0.009)***
0.024 -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.002 0.011
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.005)
0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.015 -0.094
(0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.01) (0.017) (0.023)**
-0.014 -0.009 -0.009 -0.006 -0.016 0.165
(0.003)** (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002)*** (0.015)***
- - - - - -0.981
- - - - - (0.027)***
Sector and Region fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Trend YES NO NO NO NO YES
Sector specific trends NO YES YES YES YES NO
Productivity NO NO YES YES YES NO
Recession dummy NO NO NO YES NO NO
GDP growth rate NO NO NO NO YES NO
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Post 1990×Small firms×Pre-reform
variance of empl. growth by sector
Post 1990×Small firms×Pre-reform





Post 1990 × Small firms 
Notes: Only permanent workers and firms below 35 workers are included. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis allow for clustering by period/size. All specifications control for sectoral and region effects, age,
occupation and total number of employees in the firm. Some specifications include sectoral productivity which
is calculated as value-added deflated using a sector-level PPI over the number of workers using 1995 as the
base year. Columns (4), and (5) control for size-specific cyclical effects. Column (4) interacts the small dummy
with an expansion dummy, which takes the value of 1 for 1992-1993 and 0 otherwise, while column (5)
interacts the small dummy with GDP growth. Column (6) includes interactions between the small firm dummy,
the post reform dummy and the pre-reform variance of employment growth by sector and size. *** denotes
significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and * denotes significance at the 10%
level.
A.  YOUNG (age ≤ 25) - N = 5850
B.  MIDDLE AGE (26 ≤ age ≤ 50) - N = 24611
C.  OLD (age > 50) - N = 5221




variance of empl. growth by sector
Post 1990 × Small firms Table 7: WOMEN. Effects of the 1990 reform on accessions by age groups
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
-0.027 -0.045 -0.051 -0.022 -0.062 -0.024
(0.033) (0.02) (0.016)** (0.017) (0.047) (0.032)
0.002 0 0 -0.001 0.003 0.233
(0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.067) (0.067)**
0.004 0.011 0.01 -0.024 0.008 0.029
(0.001)** (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)** (0.035) (0.011)*
- - - - - -0.179
- - - - - (0.066)*
0.047 -0.013 -0.008 -0.011 -0.012 0.038
(0.019)* (0.006) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.021)
0.04 0.042 0.041 0.041 0.056 -0.003
(0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.028)
-0.021 -0.025 -0.024 -0.026 -0.032 0.137
(0.002)*** (0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)***
- - - - - -0.902
- - - - - (0.017)***
0.074 0.054 0.035 0.017 0.022 (0.029)
(0.026)* (0.02)* (0.035) (0.034) (0.026) 0.229
0.145 0.149 0.153 0.155 0.137 (0.07)**
(0.044)** (0.044)** (0.041)** (0.04)** (0.029)** -0.126
-0.075 -0.083 -0.087 -0.074 -0.078 (0.014)***
(0.008)*** (0.009)*** (0.006)*** (0.007)*** (0.015)** 0.487
- - - - - (0.034)***
-----
Sector and Region fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Trend YES NO NO NO NO YES
Sector specific trends NO YES YES YES YES NO
Productivity NO NO YES YES YES NO
Recession dummy NO NO NO YES NO NO
GDP growth rate NO NO NO NO YES NO
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C.  OLD (age > 50) - N = 1209
Post 1990×Small firms×Pre-reform
variance of empl. growth by sector
A.  YOUNG (age ≤ 25) - N = 4563
B.  MIDDLE AGE (26 ≤ age ≤ 50) - N = 13504
Post 1990×Small firms×Pre-reform
variance of empl. growth by sector
Small firms
Post 1990 × Small firms 
Post 1990 
Post 1990×Small firms×Pre-reform
variance of empl. growth by sector
Post 1990 
Small firms
Post 1990 × Small firms 
Post 1990 
Notes: Only permanent workers and firms below 35 workers are included. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis allow for clustering by period/size. All specifications control for sectoral and region effects, age,
occupation and total number of employees in the firm. Some specifications include sectoral productivity which
is calculated as value-added deflated using a sector-level PPI over the number of workers using 1995 as the
base year. Columns (4), and (5) control for size-specific cyclical effects. Column (4) interacts the small dummy
with an expansion dummy, which takes the value of 1 for 1992-1993 and 0 otherwise, while column (5)
interacts the small dummy with GDP growth. Column (6) includes interactions between the small firm dummy,
the post reform dummy and the pre-reform variance of employment growth by sector and size. *** denotes
significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and * denotes significance at the 10%
level.
Small firms
Post 1990 × Small firms Table 8: Effects of the 1990 reform on separations by gender
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
-0.024 -0.045 -0.045 -0.039 -0.03 -0.037
(0.016) (0.011)** (0.011)** (0.01)** (0.008)** (0.012)**
-0.015 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.02
(0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023)
-0.029 -0.031 -0.031 -0.026 -0.031 -0.021
(0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)***
- - - - - 0.028
- - - - - (0.017)
0.037 -0.032 -0.018 -0.021 -0.012 0.035
(0.015)* (0.008)** (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015)
0.034 0.034 0.033 0.033 0.059 0.12
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)** (0.031)**
-0.034 -0.035 -0.033 -0.04 -0.047 0.13
(0.001)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)*** (0.004)***
- - - - - -0.994
- - - - - (0.025)***
Sector and Region fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Trend YES NO NO NO NO YES
Sector specific trends NO YES YES YES YES NO
Productivity NO NO YES YES YES NO
Recession dummy NO NO NO YES NO NO
GDP growth rate NO NO NO NO YES NO
27
Post 1990×Small firms×Pre-reform
variance of empl. growth by sector
Post 1990×Small firms×Pre-reform
variance of empl. growth by sector
Post 1990 
Notes: Only permanent workers and firms below 35 workers are included. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis allow for clustering by period/size. All specifications control for sectoral and region effects, age,
occupation and total number of employees in the firm. Some specifications include sectoral productivity which
is calculated as value-added deflated using a sector-level PPI over the number of workers using 1995 as the
base year. Columns (4), and (5) control for size-specific cyclical effects. Column (4) interacts the small dummy
with an expansion dummy, which takes the value of 1 for 1992-1993 and 0 otherwise, while column (5)
interacts the small dummy with GDP growth. Column (6) includes interactions between the small firm dummy,
the post reform dummy and the pre-reform variance of employment growth by sector and size. *** denotes
significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and * denotes significance at the 10%
level.
Small firms
Post 1990 × Small firms 
A.  MEN - N = 35762
B.  WOMEN - N = 19276
Post 1990 
Small firms
Post 1990 × Small firms Table 9: MEN. Effects of the 1990 reform on separations by age groups
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
-0.061 -0.069 -0.069 -0.048 -0.019 -0.074
(0.018)** (0.008)*** (0.012)*** (0.012)** (0.02) (0.016)**
0.016 0.019 0.019 0.02 0.048 0.079
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.027) (0.068)
-0.029 -0.035 -0.035 -0.04 -0.05 -0.057
(0.004)*** (0.007)** (0.007)** (0.008)** (0.011)** (0.005)***
- - - - - 0.245
- - - - - (0.067)**
-0.035 -0.047 -0.047 -0.042 -0.036 -0.052
(0.011)* (0.009)** (0.009)** (0.009)** (0.009)** (0.009)***
-0.028 -0.027 -0.027 -0.027 -0.035 -0.057
(0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.03) (0.027)
-0.018 -0.021 -0.021 -0.015 -0.016 -0.013
(0.001)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)**
- - - - - 0.07
- - - - - (0.025)*
0.024 -0.036 -0.038 -0.037 -0.022 0.005
(0.053) (0.035) (0.036) (0.039) (0.043) (0.043)
0.017 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.055 -0.027
(0.03) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.041) (0.066)
-0.055 -0.047 -0.048 -0.049 -0.071 0.125
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)*** (0.009)***
- - - - - -0.96
- - - - - (0.034)***
Sector and Region fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Trend YES NO NO NO NO YES
Sector specific trends NO YES YES YES YES NO
Productivity NO NO YES YES YES NO
Recession dummy NO NO NO YES NO NO
GDP growth rate NO NO NO NO YES NO
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B.  MIDDLE AGE (26 ≤ age ≤ 50) - N = 24611
C.  OLD (age > 50) - N = 5221
Post 1990×Small firms×Pre-reform
variance of empl. growth by sector
Post 1990 
Small firms
Post 1990 × Small firms 
Post 1990×Small firms×Pre-reform
variance of empl. growth by sector
Post 1990×Small firms× Pre-reform
variance of empl. growth by sector
A.  YOUNG (age ≤ 25) - N = 5850
Post 1990 
Small firms
Post 1990 × Small firms 
Post 1990 × Small firms 
Notes: Only permanent workers and firms below 35 workers are included. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis allow for clustering by period/size. All specifications control for sectoral and region effects, age,
occupation and total number of employees in the firm. Some specifications include sectoral productivity which
is calculated as value-added deflated using a sector-level PPI over the number of workers using 1995 as the
base year. Columns (4), and (5) control for size-specific cyclical effects. Column (4) interacts the small dummy
with an expansion dummy, which takes the value of 1 for 1992-1993 and 0 otherwise, while column (5)
interacts the small dummy with GDP growth. Column (6) includes interactions between the small firm dummy,
the post reform dummy and the pre-reform variance of employment growth by sector and size. *** denotes
significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and * denotes significance at the 10%
level.
Post 1990 
Small firmsTable 10: WOMEN. Effects of the 1990 reform on separations by age groups
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.055 -0.004 0.014 0.026 0.035 0.04
(0.024) (0.02) (0.022) (0.023) (0.03) (0.023)
0.022 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.044 0.175
(0.016) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.031) (0.061)*
-0.02 -0.015 -0.011 -0.033 -0.028 0.093
(0.003)*** (0.003)** (0.004)* (0.003)** (0.022) (0.015)***
- - - - - -0.627
- - - - - (0.082)***
0.022 -0.04 -0.033 -0.035 -0.023 0.019
(0.016) (0.007)** (0.01)** (0.01)** (0.013) (0.017)
0.036 0.038 0.038 0.037 0.071 0.105
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)* (0.026)*
-0.04 -0.045 -0.044 -0.051 -0.062 0.135
(0.002)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.008)*** (0.006)***
- - - - - -1.044
- - - - - (0.036)***
0.063 -0.042 0.009 -0.053 -0.056 0.095
(0.07) (0.034) (0.034) (0.032) (0.038) (0.059)
0.031 0.055 0.043 0.047 -0.051 0.135
(0.061) (0.054) (0.057) (0.055) (0.052) (0.054)
0.01 -0.001 0.008 0.053 0.058 0.059
(0.011) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009)*** (0.013)** (0.026)
- - - - - -0.502
- - - - - (0.149)*
Sector and Region fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Trend YES NO NO NO NO YES
Sector specific trends NO YES YES YES YES NO
Productivity NO NO YES YES YES NO
Recession dummy NO NO NO YES NO NO
GDP growth rate NO NO NO NO YES NO
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C.  OLD (age > 50) - N = 1209
B.  MIDDLE AGE (26 ≤ age ≤ 50) - N = 13504
A.  YOUNG (age ≤ 25) - N = 4563
Post 1990×Small firms×Pre-reform
variance of empl. growth by sector
Post 1990×Small firms×Pre-reform
variance of empl. growth by sector
Post 1990×Small firms×Pre-reform
variance of empl. growth by sector
Post 1990 
Small firms
Post 1990 × Small firms 
Post 1990 
Small firms
Post 1990 × Small firms 
Notes: Only permanent workers and firms below 35 workers are included. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis allow for clustering by period/size. All specifications control for sectoral and region effects, age,
occupation and total number of employees in the firm. Some specifications include sectoral productivity which
is calculated as value-added deflated using a sector-level PPI over the number of workers using 1995 as the
base year. Columns (4), and (5) control for size-specific cyclical effects. Column (4) interacts the small dummy
with an expansion dummy, which takes the value of 1 for 1992-1993 and 0 otherwise, while column (5)
interacts the small dummy with GDP growth. Column (6) includes interactions between the small firm dummy,
the post reform dummy and the pre-reform variance of employment growth by sector and size. *** denotes
significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and * denotes significance at the 10%
level.
Post 1990 × Small firms 
Post 1990 
Small firmsTable 11: Effects of the 1990 reform on firms' entry and exit
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.008 0.009 0.01 0.019 0.014 0.01 0.004 0.007
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)** (0.01) (0.007)
-0.066 -0.066 -0.066 -0.001 -0.002 0.003 -0.113 -0.019
(0.023)* (0.023)* (0.023)* (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.021)** (0.033)
-0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.009 -0.009 -0.012 0.035 0.026
(0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.005)* (0.005)* (0.006)** (0.004)*** (0.019)
------ -0.218 -0.216
------ (0.009)*** (0.113)*
0.007 0.008 0.008 -0.03 -0.032 -0.031 -0.001 -0.031
(0.001)*** (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.006)*** (0.001) (0.007)***
-0.11 -0.109 -0.109 -0.031 -0.031 -0.029 -0.138 0.049
(0.024)** (0.024)** (0.024)** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.009)*** (0.024)*** (0.034)
0.011 0.009 0.009 0.028 0.026 0.027 -0.012 0.015
(0.001)*** (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.006)*** (0.003)** (0.02)
------ 0.183 0.076
------ (0.013)*** (0.116)
Sector and Region fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Trend YES NO NO NO NO NO YES NO
Sector specific trends NO YES YES YES YES YES NO NO
Productivity NO NO YES YES YES YES NO YES
Recession dummy NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO
GDP growth rate NO NO NO NO NO YES NO YES
Firms fixed effects NO NO NO YES YES YES NO YES
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A.  DEPENDENT VARIABLE: ENTRY DUMMY - N = 60562
Post 1990 
Small firms
Post 1990 × Small firms 
Post 1990 × Small firms 
Post 1990×Small firms×Pre-reform
variance of empl. growth by sector
Notes: Only firms below 35 workers are included. Robust standard errors in parenthesis allow for clustering by period/size. When
possible, observations are weighted for the probability that a firms actually enters the sample (given by the average number of
employees/90). All specifications control for fixed sectoral and region effects and for the total number of employees in the firm. Some
specifications include sectoral productivity which is calculated as value-added deflated using a sector-level PPI over the number of
workers using 1995 as the base year. Columns (5), and (6) control for size-specific cyclical effects. Column (4) interacts the small
dummy with an expansion dummy, which takes the value of 1 for 1992-1993 and 0 otherwise, while columns (6) interacts the small
dummy with GDP growth. Columns (7) and (8) include interactions between the small firm dummy, the post reform dummy and the
pre-reform variance of employment growth by sector and size. *** Denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the
5% level and * denotes significance at the 10% level.
Post 1990×Small firms×Pre-reform
variance of empl. growth by sector
B.  DEPENDENT VARIABLE: EXIT DUMMY - N = 60562
Post 1990 
Small firmsTable 12: Effects of the 1990 reform on firms' labour demand
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.05 0.056 0.05 0.025 0.017 0.018
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.01) (0.011) (0.011)
0.166 0.169 0.169 0.075 0.075 0.07
(0.026)*** (0.025)*** (0.025)*** (0.015)*** (0.015)*** (0.018)***
-0.051 -0.057 -0.057 -0.032 -0.032 -0.029













Sector and Region fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Trend YES NO NO NO NO NO
Sector specific trends NO YES YES YES YES YES
Productivity NO NO YES YES YES YES
Recession dummy NO NO NO NO YES NO
GDP growth rate NO NO NO NO NO YES
Firms fixed effects NO NO NO YES YES YES
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Post 1990 × Small firms 
Notes: Only firms below 35 workers are included. In panel A robust standard errors in parenthesis allow for
clustering by period/size. When possible, observations are weighted for the probability that a firms actually
enters the sample (given by the average number of employees/90). All specifications control for fixed sectoral
and region effects and for the total number of employees in the firm. Some specifications include sectoral
productivity which is calculated as value-added deflated using a sector-level PPI over the number of workers
using 1995 as the base year. Columns (5), and (6) control for size-specific cyclical effects. Column (4)
interacts the small dummy with an expansion dummy, which takes the value of 1 for 1992-1993 and 0
otherwise, while columns (6) interacts the small dummy with GDP growth. *** Denotes significance at the 1%
level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and * denotes significance at the 10% level.








DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Absolute value of the growth rate of 
emplyoment - N = 41586
A.  i.i.d errors
Post 1990 
Small firmsTable 13: Effects of the 1990 reform on the variance of employment growth rates
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
0.078 0.078 0.078 0.063 0.069
(0.022)** (0.023)** (0.023)** (0.029)** (0.032)
0.116 0.117 0.117 0.117 0.118
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.004)***
-0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.082 -0.08
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.003)***
Sector and Region fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Trend YES NO NO NO NO
Sector specific trends NO YES YES YES YES
Productivity NO NO YES YES YES
Recession dummy NO NO NO YES NO
GDP growth rate NO NO NO NO YES
32
Post 1990 × Small firms 
Notes: Only firms below 35 workers are included. Robust standard errors in parenthesis allow for
clustering by period/size. All specifications control for fixed sectoral and region effects. Sectoral
productivity is calculated as value-added deflated using a sector-level PPI over the number of
workers using 1995 as the base year. Columns (4), and (5) control for size-specific cyclical
effects. Column (4) interacts the small dummy with an expansion dummy, which takes the value of
1 for 1992-1993 and 0 otherwise, while columns (5) interacts the small dummy with GDP growth.
*** Denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and * denotes
significance at the 10% level.
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:   variance of employment 
growth of small and large firms by year and sector        
N = 198
Post 1990 
Small firms